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ABSTRACT: Toulmin’s DWC model recognizes a plurality of argument cultures through the thesis of field
dependency: that the normative features of arguments vary from one field to the next. Yet, little consensus
exists concerning the nature and foundations of argument fields. This paper explores the question of
whether Toulminian fields have any useful role to play in the epistemic evaluation of arguments.
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[…] it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as
the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a
mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs. (Aristotle, Nicomachean
Ethics, Bk1 Ch. 3; 1094b 12-27)

1. INTRODUCTION
In addition to his Data-Warrant-Claim theory of argument structure and the
accompanying idea that the acceptability of warrants is a centerpiece of argument
evaluation, Toulmin’s notion of argument fields contributes prominently to his legacy in
argumentation studies. Indeed it is primarily through the notion of field dependency—
that the normative features of arguments vary from one field to the next—that Toulmin’s
model recognizes a plurality of argument cultures. Yet, the nature and foundations of
argument fields is poorly understood, and a matter about which there remains little or no
consensus. Further, unlike the time in which Toulmin introduced the notion of fields, the
theses of pragmatism—that standards of good argument ought to be relative to the goals
of argumentation (or, that a good argument is one that achieves its purpose)—and
situationalism—that the standards of good argument ought to be situationally
appropriate—are now more generally accepted by argument theorists and epistemologists
alike. This raises the question of whether the notion of field has any useful role to play in
evaluative theories of argument.
In this paper I will argue that evaluative theories of argument are better off
without the notion of fields. While fields have embedded within them several important
*
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notions that will aid in the evaluation of arguments, they also lead to a relativism best
avoided.
2. FIELD DEPENDENCY AND NORMATIVE PLURALISM
From an epistemological perspective, the most significant feature of argument fields is
the thesis of field-dependency. Toulmin distinguished those features of arguments that are
field invariant from those that are field dependent. The former include similarities of
procedure and form which “hold good throughout a wide range of fields” (2003, p. 21)
such as the D-W-C structural form of arguments and the force of certain modal terms,
while the latter encompasses components of the argument such as its type of data and
backing as well as the evaluative criteria of pertaining to it.
Thus, a consequence of field-dependency is normative pluralism. Argument
features like warrant, backing and the criteria used to employ logical terms are
irreducibly normative features of argument. They capture the evidentiary and justificatory
relations constitutive of ‘good reasons’ and in so doing, embody the canons and standards
by which arguments are properly evaluated. Yet, these are the very features of argument
which vary from one field to the next. So, the controversial aspect of the fielddependency thesis is normative pluralism.
Contrary to the aspirations of the formal logicians, there cannot be a single,
universal and abstract model of all justification and hence of (good) arguments. Thus, one
key thesis of theoretical import in Toulmin’s program is the claim that “we must judge
each field of substantial arguments by its own relevant standards” (2003, p. 216). Indeed,
Toulmin (2003, p. 235) claims that validity itself is a field-dependent property of
arguments.
What has to be recognized first is that validity is an intra-field, not an inter-field notion.
Arguments within any field can be judged by standards appropriate within that field, and some
will fall short; but it must be expected that the standards will be field-dependent, and that the
merits to be demanded of an argument in one field will be found to be absent (in the nature of
things) from entirely meritorious arguments in another.

It is because arguments cannot all be evaluated by the same set of standards and norms
that the theorist must appreciate the nature, boundaries, and inner structure of argument
fields. Fields are, as it were, the natural kinds of evidentiary relations, and it is for this
reason that fields capture something fundamental about the very nature of justification.
(Godden 2003, p. 370).
3. EPISTEMOLOGICAL RELATIVISM
A problem with the ideas of normative pluralism and field-dependency is that together
they seem readily to lead to a full-bodied relativism. A useful way of defining
epistemological relativism can be found in Boghossian’s (2006, p. 2) Doctrine of Equal
Validity:
Equal Validity: There are many different, yet “equally valid” ways of knowing the world […]
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It would seem that Toulmin’s view could easily result in the doctrine of equal validity. In
the first place, normative pluralism entails that a given argument (understood as a
premise-conclusion set, or a D-W-C collection of propositions) could be valid in one field
and invalid in another. Thus, a conclusion could be acceptable in one field, but
unacceptable in another. So far, this seems to be an unobjectionable and true descriptive
claim about what arguers in different fields might judge to be acceptable.
But, when combined with the claim that all evaluative standards are themselves
field-dependent, it seems that there is no way of ranking, comparing or otherwise
evaluating the different and conflicting judgements of validity and acceptability. Rather,
it seems that the rational judge is only able to offer verdicts of the following sorts: the
argument is valid in field-A but invalid in field-B, 1 or according to my field-dependent
standards the argument is (in)valid—but according to your equally field-dependent
standards it might well be valid, or finally, according to some field-dependent standard
the standards of field-A are better than those of field-B and so field-A judgements are
preferable to field-B judgements—but again, according to your equally field-dependent
standards the opposite might be so. In none of these judgements is one able to
categorically claim that some arguments are simply invalid, some conclusions are simply
unacceptable, or some judgements are plainly more acceptable than others. Being
deprived of any field-independent standard of measure or comparison, the rational judge
is further compelled to concede that judgements made in fields other than his own cannot
objectively be deemed to be any better or worse than his own. Thus, we have landed in
the realm of equal-validity.
For reasons that I won’t explore in this paper, but which have been set out
extensively and convincingly by authors such as Siegel (1987) and Boghossian (2006) I
take it that such a view is unacceptable. Thus, the epistemologist must either find some
account of fields that does not lead to such a relativism, or abandon them entirely.
In the remainder of this paper I will argue that, while there are valuable lessons to
drawn from Toulmin’s ideas about fields, evaluative theories of argument will best get by
without them.
4. THE NATURE OF FIELDS
Recently, Roland (2008, pp. 240-242) has provided a useful inventory of the existing
accounts of the nature of fields, which summarize (and amend slightly) as follows.
1.
2.

Ontological: Fields are subject matter domains (and covary with ontological
differences). (Klumpp 1981, p. 50)
Anthropological: Fields are communities of arguers or audiences (and covary
with human differences). (McKerrow 1980; Willard 1981, p. 24)

1

Importantly, as much as Toulmin (e.g., Toulmin 2006) rather ignored the relativistic consequences of his
field-theory, it is seems clear that Toulmin would never embrace a relativism about facts. For example, the
fact that argument A justifies claim C in field F is not itself field dependent fact. There is nothing in
Toulmin to suggest that he views the facts giving rise to the data in some field or other as being field
dependent. Rather, the limit of Toulmin’s exposure to relativism seems to be about a special class of
epistemic facts, eg., about whether argument A justifies claim C.
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3.

4.

5.

Linguistic: Fields are domains of discourse (and covary with linguistic or
conceptual differences). (i) Epistemological: e.g., Kneupper’s (1981, p. 81)
“knowledge structures” and Wenzel’s (1982, p. 204) “the propositional
context of a disciplined rational enterprise with an epistemological purpose.”
(ii) Logical: (Godden 2003)
Sociological / Psychological: Fields are (a) sociological or (b) psychological
categories (and covary with human or social or psychological differences). (i)
Disciplinary: (Kneupper 1981; Klumpp 1981); (ii) Symbolic Structures: e.g.,
Gronbeck’s (1981, p. 15) “collections of communicative rules”; (iii) Purely
Psychological: Willard (1981)
Pragmatic: Fields are practices (which covary according to their pragmatic
utility in problem-solving). (Roland 1981, 1982; Wenzel 1982; Hanson 1989)

While Roland (2008) argues that these different approaches are complementary rather
than in competition with each other, it is not clear that this amalgamative approach 2 helps
to solve the epistemological problems presented by many of the characterizations of
fields here.
If the evaluative properties of arguments in fact depend on any of the
psychological, sociological, anthropological, disciplinary, conceptual, linguistic, or
symbolic, features of arguments then it seems that there is little prospect of avoiding the
problem of equal validity. (So, combining them won’t help either.) Let’s consider a
couple of examples. 3 If fields covary with audiences (NB: not the knowledge states of
different audiences! but simply the audiences themselves) then what is a valid—not
effective or persuasive—argument to one audience need not be valid for a different
audience. Thus, that one audience finds an argument to be valid while another does not
marks the final assessment that an evaluative theory of argument can give. Without any
further measure to compare or evaluate them, each of these different findings must be
equally valid.
Take a second example: suppose that fields are disciplinary. At first glace, the
idea that the probative merits of an argument, or the acceptability of a claim, can vary
from one discipline to the next seems to make some good sense. An argument about the
chemical composition of a rock sample might be quite adequate in geology and quite
inadequate in gemology. Yet should this be the final word on how the relative merits of
arguments can be evaluated? Are there not some arguments of which we want to say that
they are (no) good no good no matter what discipline belong to or are offered in? Do we
really want to say that the prophecies of an astrologer are based on astrologically good
arguments and leave it at that?
Put another way, one of the evaluative properties of arguments that is of
paramount significance from an epistemological point of view is whether their premises
provide good reasons for their conclusions. That is to say, whether, and to what degree,
the truth of their premises establishes or demonstrates the truth—or likelihood—of their
2

It might be remarked that Toulmin himself seems quite content with this amalgamative approach to the
nature of fields.
3
For reasons that will become clear below, I do not reject the pragmatic approach just listed. Instead, I
claim that the virtues of a pragmatic approach to argument assessment can be realized without invoking the
problematic rubric of argument fields.
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conclusions. The epistemic merits of an argument depend on whether, and to what
degree, its premises conduct truth to its conclusion. Surely, in some disciplines (geology)
we can accept a greater margin of error than in others (gemology). Thus different
disciplines can adopt strict or lax standards according to their purposes. Yet, there are
some arguments which always conduct truth from premises to conclusions, and the merits
of such arguments should be recognized in every discipline. Similarly, there are other
arguments which entirely fail to conduct truth from premises to conclusions. It does not
approbate such arguments to say that they are in common circulation in some discipline,
culture, practice or language game.
An Attempt to Rescue Fields from Relativism
Bermejo-Luque (2006) has recently argued that Toulminean fields do not entail
epistemological relativism. She does this by focusing on the good idea that fielddependency pertains to the modality of claims: the criteria for the application of a modal
term is field-dependent, while the force of a modal term is field-invariant. As she (2006,
p. 72) puts it, for Toulmin “to argue is to try to establish the modality of a claim” and
to evaluate an argument is to determine which modal qualification is appropriate for the claim,
given the reason adduced for it, or whether the modal qualification provided by the arguer is
correct or not.

As much as I applaud and agree with Bermejo-Luque’s overall approach, I don’t
think that it saves Toulmin’s view from the dangers of relativism. There are two main
problems with this type of argument. First, it is not at all clear that the force of modal
qualifiers really is field-invariant. For example, Toulmin describes the force of
“impossible” as including “the implied injunction that something-or-other [i.e., some
claim, p] has to be ruled out in this-or-that way for such-a-reason” and of “possible” as
“[to] concede that it [again, some claim, p] has a right to be considered” (2003, p. 17).
Yet, it is not clear that this entitlement to be considered, or ruling-out (obligation to
exclude from consideration), really is invariant across fields. That something is
technically or practically impossible does not mean that it should be ruled out from
consideration in theoretical physics. Similarly, that something is logically possible does
not mean that it merits consideration in a forensic or scientific investigation. Nor perhaps
should its metaphysical impossibility exclude it from consideration in physics. Recall
Kant’s argument that it is metaphysically impossible that space be non-Euclidian.
Physicists did not, nor should they have, ruled this out in advancing their theories. That
something is theoretically impossible might mean that we should change our theory, not
refrain from considering it as a possibility. Thus, the force of modal terms is not invariant
across fields. That something merits consideration or should be ruled out in one context
does not mean that it merits consideration or should be ruled out in some other context.
Perhaps, though, Toulmin means that the force of “physically impossible” is field
invariant. Thus, that something is physically impossible does not mean that I should rule
it out as a logical possibility. At this point, modal terms might well be field invariant, but
it is no longer clear why we should accept that the criteria for establishing physical
impossibility are field-dependent. Rather, it seems that every field is committed to the
same criteria for establishing physical impossibility. Further, that different fields are
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committed to different modal-criteria will be evidenced in that they treat the modal-force
of claims differently.
Toulmin’s claim concerning the difference between the criteria and force of
modal terms seems to equivocate upon those modal terms. “Impossible” is interpreted as
“impossibility simpliciter” when it comes to the field-dependency of the criteria and
“physical impossibility” when it comes to the field-invariance of force. Sticking with the
former, it seems that both force and criteria are field-dependent, while with the latter it
seems that neither is field dependent.
A second problem arises when we note some additional ‘modalities’ of central
interest when making and evaluating arguments: specifically truth and falsity. The claim
that the force of “true” is field-dependent does not lead merely to the relativism of
evaluative properties of argument, but to a full-blown relativism of all facts. Further, if
the modalities of truth and falsity are field-dependent then claims across fields cannot
even be compared. If field-A contains P amongst its truths, while field-B contains ~P,
there is no genuine contradiction since P(field-A) is not a contradictory of ~P(field-B).
To avoid the Doctrine of Equal Validity, the force of truth (as a modality) must be fieldindependent. But if this is so, then the criteria for this modality cannot be field-dependent.
5. LESSONS FROM TOULMIN
Toulmin (1989, pp. 380-381) sought to re-humanize the study of argument by
distinguishing the formal and functional elements of argument, and changing the subject
matter of argument from a “string of propositions” to a “human interchange.” Many of
the attempts to operationalize fields have sought to bring arguments closer to arguers as a
way of finding more appropriate standards and means for evaluating them. In and of
itself, this is a laudable project. Further, a number of useful insights can be drawn out of
Toulmin’s ideas about fields. Predominant among these might be the following:
1. normative pluralism: there are a number of non-equivalent, non-reducible
standards of evidence against which inferences, including inferences used in
arguments, can be measured / evaluated (Godden 2005)
2. situationalism: the standard of evidence used to evaluate a situated inference
should be situationally appropriate (Godden 2005)
3. pragmatism: that standards of good argument ought to be relative to the goals
of argumentation (or, a good argument is one which achieves its purpose)
(Roland 2008) 4
Yet, if these are the kinds of lessons to be learned from Toulmin’s work, then it would
seem that they can be implemented into workable normative theories of argument without
any reliance on the problematic notion of fields whatsoever.
4

Notice that if normative pluralism is false, then pragmatism and situationalism are insignificant. The
theses of pragmatism and situationalism are theses which guide rational actors in their selection of rational
norms. If there are no normative options available, then guidelines for choices among them are not
required.
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6. CONCLUSION: DOING WITHOUT FIELDS
If what I have said in the preceding pages is correct then it is epistemically desirable to
dispense with the notion of fields when evaluating arguments. How might this be done?
One answer is to draw upon another idea from Toulmin’s work: the warrant. Warrants,
you will recall, are “general, hypothetical statements which can act as bridges [between
datum and claim] and authorize the sort of step to which our particular argument commits
us” (2003, p. 91).
While Toulmin (2003, p. 93; 1992, p. 9) claimed that warrants are one of those
field-dependent features of argument, recent work (primarily due to Hitchcock 1985,
1998 and Pinto 2006) 5 suggests that a robust and workable theory of warrants, suitable
for the objective evaluation of argument, can be provided without reference to argument
fields whatsoever.
A key feature of warrants is that they can be evaluated according to their truth
conductivity or reliability. 6 While measures are entirely objective, preventing the slide to
relativism, they can be applied in such a way as to make them relative to an arguer’s
goals or purposes, thus allowing for the situationalism and pragmatism that seem to
follow as general mores of evaluation from Toulmin’s work.
Link to commentary
REFERENCES
Bermejo-Luque, L. (2006). Toulmin’s model of argument and the question of relativism. In: D. Hitchcock
and B. Verheij (Eds.), Arguing on the Toulmin Model: New Essays in Argument Analysis
andEvaluation (pp. 71-85), Dordrecht: Springer.
Boghossian, P.A. (2006). Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Godden, D.M. (2003). On Toulmin’s fields and Wittgenstein’s later views on logic. In: F.H. van Eemeren,
J.A. Blair, C.A. Willard and A.F. Snoeck-Henkemans (Eds.), Proceedings of the fifth Conference
of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 369-375), Amsterdam: SicSat.
5

Building on Hitchcock’s work, Pinto has advanced a normative theory of argument based on a qualitative
evidence proportionalism (2006, p. 115-116) whereby

the sort of doxastic attitude one adopts toward a proposition should be appropriate to the evident
reasons which favor it” and where “rationality is a matter of making our attitudes towards
propositions […] appropriate to the evidence which shapes them.
6
Pinto (2006) offers a sketch of the reliability of warrants which he explicitly traces back to Toulmin (pp.
128-131) whereby “not all rules which are truth-preserving are fit to be relied upon, and […] not all
inferences which are fit to be relied upon are truth-preserving” (p. 123). He does this by offering an
explicitly pragmatic account of inferential virtue, whereby a good inference is, if I may put it crudely, one
that gets you where you want to go. In doing this, Pinto (p. 127) shifts from a truth preservation conception
of argument virtue to an entitlement preserving conception of argument virtue. It might be said that such
warrants are satisficing rather than optimizing when it comes to their truth-preserving properties.
What is important to note for my purposes here is that, in focusing on the evaluation of warrants,
one need not choose between a veritistic epistemology (Goldman 1999, p. 5) where the attaining of truth is
ultimate goal of reasoning and argument, and a view which allows for a broader set of purposes by aiming
instead at one some practically desirable degree of verisimilitude (cf. Pinto 2006, p. 115).

7

DAVID M. GODDEN
Godden, D.M. (2005). Deductivism as an interpretative strategy: A reply to Groarke’s defense of
reconstructive deductivism. Argumentation and Advocacy, 41, 168-183.
Goldman, A.I. (2003). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gronbeck, B.E. (1981). Socio-cultural notions of argument fields: A primer. In: G. Ziegelmueller and J.
Rhodes (Eds.), Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the second summer conference on
argumentation (pp. 1-20), Annandale, VA.: Speech Communication Association.
Hanson, J. (1989). Argument fields, logical types, and shared purposes. In: B.E. Gronbeck (Ed.), Spheres of
Argument: Proceedings of the sixth SCA/AFA conference on argumentation (pp. 275-285),
Annandlae, VA: Speech Communication Association.
Klumpp, J.F. (1981). A dramatistic approach to fields. In: G. Ziegelmueller & J. Rhodes (Eds.),
Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings for the second summer conference on argumentation (pp.
44-55), Annandale, VA.: Speech Communication Association.
Kneupper, C.W. (1981). Argument fields: some social constructivist observations. In: G. Ziegelmueller &
J. Rhodes (Eds.), Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings for the second summer conference on
argumentation (pp. 80-87), Annandale, VA.: Speech Communication Association.
McKerrow, R.E. (1980). Argument communities: a quest for distinctions. In: J. Rhodes and S. Newell
(Eds.), Proceedings of the [First] Summer Conference on Argumentation (pp. 214-227), Falls
Church, VA.: Speech and Communication Association and American Forensic Association.
Pinto, R.C. (2006). Evaluating inferences: The nature and role of warrants. In: D. Hitchcock and B. Verheij
(Eds.), Arguing on the Toulmin Model: New Essays in Argument Analysis and Evaluation (pp.
115-143), Dordrecht: Springer.
Rowland, R.C. (1981). Argument fields. In: G. Ziegelmueller and J. Rhodes (Eds.), Dimensions of
Argument: Proceedings for the second summer conference on argumentation (pp. 56-79),
Annandale, VA.: Speech Communication Association.
Rowland, R.C. (1982). The influence of purpose on fields of argument. Journal of the American Forensic
Association, 18, 228-245.
Rowland, R.C. (2008). Purpose, argument fields, and theoretical justification. Argumentation 22, 235-250.
Siegel, H. (1987). Relativism Refuted: A critique or contemporary epistemological relativism. Dordrecht:
D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Toulmin, S.E. (1989). Logic and the Criticism of Arguments. In: James Golden, Goodwin Berquist &
William Cloeman (Eds.), The Rhetoric of Western Thought, 4th ed. (pp. 374-388), Iowa:
Kendal/Hunt Publishing Company.
Toulmin, S.E. (1992). Logic, rhetoric and reason: redressing the balance. In: F.H. van Eemeren, R.
Grootendorst, J.A. Blair and C.A. Willard (Eds.), Argumentation Illuminated: Proceedings of the
second ISSA conference on argumentation (pp. 3-11), Amsterdam: SicSat.
Toulmin, S.E. (2003). The Uses of Argument. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Orig. pub. 1958.]
Toulmin, S.E. (2006). Reasoning in theory and practice. In: D. Hitchcock and B. Verheij (Eds.), Arguing on
the Toulmin Model: New essays in argument analysis and evaluation (pp. 25-29), Dordrecht:
Springer.
Wenzel, J.W. (1982). On fields of argument as propositional systems. Journal of the American Forensic
Association, 18, 204-213.
Willard, C.A. (1981). Argument fields: A Cartesian meditation. In: G. Ziegelmueller and J. Rhodes (Eds.),
Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the second summer conference on argumentation (pp.
21-43). Annandale, VA.: Speech Communication Association.

8

